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Abstract The measurement of diagnostic accuracy is an important aspect of the
evaluation of diagnostic tests. Sometimes, medical researchers try to discover the
set of observations that are most accurate of all by directly inspecting diseased and
not-diseased patients. This method is perhaps intuitively appealing, as it seems a
straightforward empirical way of discovering how to identify diseased patients, which
amounts to trying to correlate the results of diagnostic tests with disease status. I
present three examples of researchers who try to produce definitive diagnostic crite-
ria by directly inspecting diseased and not diseased patients. Despite this method’s
intuitive appeal, I will argue that it is impossible to carry out. Before researchers
can inspect these patients to discover definitive diagnostic criteria, they must be able
to distinguish diseased and not-diseased patients; and they do not know how to do
this, because this is what they are trying to discover. I suspect the intuitive appeal of
directly inspecting patients makes this difficult to appreciate. To counter this difficulty,
I present this problem as a manifestation of ‘Meno’s paradox’, which was described
in classical antiquity, and of ‘the problem of nomic measurement’, described more
recently. Considering these philosophical problems may help researchers address the
methodological issues they face when evaluating diagnostic tests.
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1 Introduction
The question of how best to detect disease is central to medical practice. This question
is most often addressed by measuring the accuracy of different methods of detecting
disease (Kennedy 2016). When evaluating diagnostic tests in this way, doctors are
concerned with determining the true disease status of a patient, and want to know how
well a test discriminates between diseased and not-diseased patients. The diagnostic
accuracy of a test (or battery of tests and observations) is “the ability of the test to
discriminate between patients with and without the target condition” (Reitsma et al.
2009, p. 797).
The accuracy of a method of detecting disease is measured by comparing the per-
formance of a diagnostic practice under evaluation, which is commonly referred to as
the “index test”, to that of a diagnostic practice which is trusted to deliver an accu-
rate result, which is commonly referred to as the “gold standard” or the “reference
standard” (Knottnerus et al. 2009; Newman and Kohn 2009, p. 99). An index test that
returns results that are in close agreement with the reference standard is considered
accurate and therefore good. Should the index test return positive results in all patients
with the disease it is said to be a perfectly “sensitive” test. Should the index test return
negative results in all patients without the disease it is said to be a perfectly “spe-
cific” test. There is a vast medical literature that measures the accuracy of different
methods of detecting disease in this way, and that presents arguments about how good
certain diagnostic practices are at detecting particular diseases based on these results
(Knottnerus and Buntinx 2009; Newman and Kohn 2009).
Many scholarly works have addressed the question of how to evaluate diagnostic
practices (Mackenzie 1916; Kahn 1942; Feinstein 1967; Wulff 1976; Gøtzsche 2007).
Despite this, medical researchers still argue that the “Poor quality of diagnostic studies
is a recognised problem” (Fontela et al. 2009), and that “the theory and methodology of
diagnostic research still lags substantially behind that of research into the effectiveness
of treatment” (Knottnerus and Buntinx 2009, p. 11). As identified by Kennedy (2016;
see also Mebius et al. 2016), philosophers have also paid almost no attention to how
diagnostic practices are evaluated in medical practice. One aim of this paper is to draw
attention to the need for researchers, clinicians and philosophers to pay more attention
to the methodology of diagnostic research. I will argue that this is the case because
many arguments that evaluate the accuracy of diagnostic practices are flawed.
Due to concerns about the quality of studies designed to measure the accuracy of
diagnostic tests, several sets of guidance have been prepared to advise researchers on
how to conduct and report their research. These sets of guidance include editions of
the STARD (standards for reporting diagnostic accuracy) and the QUADAS (quality
assessment for studies of diagnostic accuracy) (Whiting et al. 2011, 2003; Bossuyt
et al. 2003, 2015). These sets of guidance rely on there being agreed upon reference
standards against which to assess the performance of index tests. They do not, however,
offer guidance about what to do when there is no consensus about what the reference
standard for a disease is. When doctors do not agree about which patients have a
disease, how does one assess different reference standards so that the best one may be
chosen and used?
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A recent paper, entitled “A review of solutions for diagnostic accuracy studies with
an imperfect or missing reference standard”, has systematically reviewed proposed
methods for evaluating diagnostic tests in the absence of a gold standard (Reitsma
et al. 2009). These potential solutions include a number of interesting techniques,
which deserve philosophical attention. These techniques include using multiple tests
to try to more accurately diagnose disease, trying to adjust results to account for the
imperfections of the reference standard, appealing to a panel of experts to construct
a reference standard, and latent class analysis. However, in this review one important
method of measuring diagnostic accuracy is omitted—the direct inspection of diseased
and not-diseased patients to identify distinguishing characteristics. This amounts to
trying to make correlations between observations and disease status in order to deter-
mine what the gold standard should be. I say that this is an important method because
many doctors and researchers try to do this. Despite these attempts, I will argue that
this is impossible.1 I suspect Reitsma et al. (2009) recognise this, as they say that the
normal techniques for evaluating diagnostic tests do not apply to situations where the
status of a test as the most accurate test of all is questioned. “One special situation is
where the index test is proclaimed to be better than the reference standard” (Reitsma
et al. 2009, p. 803). These researchers do not, however, explain why this situation is
special. Perhaps they do not do this because they believe that it is obvious that an index
test cannot be found to be more accurate than the reference standard, as the reference
standard is the standard by which the accuracy of the index test is judged. An arrow
cannot be closer to the centre of a target than the centre of the target. Even so, that
the evaluation of a reference standard is a special epistemic situation has not been
appreciated by many medics, who continue to try to identify the most accurate way of
diagnosing disease by the direct inspection of diseased and not-diseased patients. This
paper will discuss three examples of researchers who endorse this approach. Together
these examples not only support the thesis that this approach to the evaluation of
diagnostic practices is widespread, but also provide a sense of the variety of research
contexts to which this problem applies. I draw attention to a profound problem with
this methodology, which I describe as a manifestation of a very ancient philosophical
problem, first articulated in Plato’s Meno.
My first example, discussed in Sect. 2, is drawn from the medical literature on the
diagnosis of eosinophilia–myalgia syndrome (EMS) (Hertzman et al. 2001). These
researchers inspected a group of patients with the syndrome to see whether or not a set
of diagnostic criteria they suggested was able to correctly distinguish diseased patients
from not-diseased patients. They found these criteria to be accurate, and recommended
them for use. I believe these researchers were primarily interested in producing a set
of diagnostic criteria that could be used by non-experts to select the same patients as
EMS experts, and that their methods are suited to this limited goal taken on its own.
1 Of course, if everyone is in agreement about what the which patients have a disease, then some distin-
guishing characteristics can be identified by direct inspection. The problem I identify here only arises when
there is disagreement about which patients have a disease. By distinguishing characteristics, I mean the
set of all observations that are used to distinguish diseased and not-diseased patients. For example, these
may be symptoms reported by the patient, signs observed by the doctor at physical examination, blood test
results, histopathology, results of post mortem examinations, results of diagnostic imaging, and the results
of therapeutic trials.
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However, these researchers also claim to have measured the diagnostic accuracy of
these criteria as objectively as possible, and they recommended that their methods
should be used by other researchers evaluating diagnostic practices in the absence of
a gold standard; and these claims are problematic.
The difficulties with this method are more apparent from my second example,
discussed in Sect. 3, which is drawn from the medical literature on fibromyalgia
(Wolfe et al. 1990). These researchers attempt to establish a set of diagnostic criteria
as the most accurate available by direct inspection, using similar methods to those
recommended by Hertzman et al. (2001). These researchers are, in effect, trying to
discover the criteria that can be used to define the groups of patients with and without
a certain target condition by correlating diagnostic tests results and disease status.
Although this may seem like a sensible empirical approach, it is an impossible task. The
trouble with this approach is that in order to inspect the group of patients with a disease
to see what distinguishes them from not-diseased patients, researchers must already
know how to distinguish diseased patients from not-diseased patients. If researchers
do not know how to do this at the beginning of the study, they will be unable to
identify diseased and not-diseased patients, which they need to do to carry out their
research. Even though this may seem like an obvious problem that should not manifest
in practice, I show here that researchers do fall into this trap.2
In Sect. 4, I argue that this problem is a manifestation of an ancient philosophical
problem discussed in Plato’s Meno, referred to as Meno’s paradox (Ebrey 2014). The
precise meaning of the passages where Plato sets out this problem is debated by schol-
ars, and I will not engage with these debates here. It is not my intention to contribute to
this scholarship by re-reading the Meno in the light of the epistemic problems encoun-
tered in medical practice. Even though Meno’s paradox may be ambiguous, in my
view Plato put his finger on an important epistemic problem, and I believe that consid-
ering this part of the Meno helps to clarify problems encountered in medical practice.
I also link Meno’s paradox with another similar and perhaps less ambiguous formula-
tion of the problem, identified by Chang (2004) when discussing the measurement of
temperature—the problem of nomic measurement. Attending to these philosophical
problems throws the difficulties encountered in the medical literature into sharp relief,
and understanding them will help doctors identify and articulate these difficulties when
they arise in other areas of medicine.
In Chang’s discussion of temperature, the problem of nomic measurement mani-
fests when researchers are trying to discover how to measure a metaphysical entity,
which it is not possible to observe directly (2004, p. 59). Some medics do seem to
think of diseases in this way. Claims that no diagnostic observation is perfectly accu-
rate occur in medical literature (Cardoso et al. 2014, p. 29; Okeh and Okoro 2012;
Duggan 1992; Versi 1992). Many prefer the term “reference standard” to the term
“gold standard” precisely because it reflects the view that tests are imperfect (Knot-
tnerus and Muris 2009, p. 50; Weinstein et al. 2005, p. 18). If all possible observations
are always imperfect indicators of a disease, then that disease is not itself observable.
2 Two of the three examples I explore here are syndromes. It may be that the paradoxical problems I am
highlighting here are particularly common in discussions about how syndromes are diagnosed. Further
empirical work is needed to answer this question.
123
Synthese
This view of disease fits with Chang’s account of the problem of nomic measurement,
but other views of disease are also available. Some argue that diseases are reductions
of biological function (Ereshefsky 2009), so the identification of reduced biological
function would count as the direct observation of a disease. There is also disagreement
about whether diseases are objective, real and natural kinds, or if they are subjective,
constructed and artificial kinds (Ereshefsky 2009; Simon 2017). Regardless of whether
diseases are taken to be observable or unobservable, objective or subjective, the prob-
lem I identify here may still appear, just so long as researchers do not know (or are
arguing about) how to recognise patients with the disease.
It is particularly important to appreciate these problems when there is a dispute
about what the characteristics by which patients with a disease can be identified are.
My third example, discussed in Sect. 5, is drawn from the medical literature on the
diagnosis of rickets in infants (Slovis and Chapman 2008b). I focus on a dispute
about how patients with rickets can be identified, and specifically on whether the
classic radiographic signs of rickets need to be present for a diagnosis to be made.
The arguments deployed in this dispute are less clearly structured than those used in
my other examples. Nevertheless, I will show that Meno’s paradox still manifests in
this literature, and argue that this discussion would be improved by recognition of this
problem.
Some doctors suggest that when there is no agreed upon gold standard, “the diag-
nostic accuracy paradigm may be abandoned in favour of alternative methods for
evaluating diagnostic tests” (Reitsma et al. 2009, p. 803). In Sect. 6, I close with a
brief discussion of some alternative strategies for evaluating diagnostic tests, as I do
not want to signal that reference standards cannot be evaluated.
2 Eosinophilia–myalgia syndrome
Eosinophilia–myalgia syndrome (EMS) is a disease marked by dramatic increases of a
certain form of white blood cell, the eosinophil, in the patient’s body, accompanied by
severe muscle pain (myalgia), fever, skin changes and respiratory symptoms (Bulpitt
et al. 1990, p. 918). It was identified following an outbreak of the syndrome that
was associated with the consumption of a certain brand of nutritional supplement
containing tryptophan in the late 1980s. Hertzman et al. (2001, p. 2302) report that
EMS has proved difficult to diagnose in epidemiological studies of the disease, and
that suggested diagnostic criteria had not been validated. They sought to produce and
validate a set of diagnostic criteria by measuring their diagnostic accuracy.
These researchers first produced a set of criteria that they believed could serve as
the most accurate diagnostic criteria for EMS. They did this by compiling a list of 45
clinical observations and test results “considered important in the diagnosis of EMS
and related disorders, and then, by consensus, reduced this list to 10 elements”. So
these 10 elements were considered the most important for the diagnosis of EMS. These
10 elements were assembled into two “patterns” considered characteristic of EMS.3
3 Pattern 1 is the presence of eosinophilia, myalgia and at least one of rash, edema, pulmonary involvement,
or neuropathy, occurring within a six-month period. Pattern 2 is the presence of fasciitis, myopathy, and
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These patterns together functioned as criteria for the diagnosis of EMS, as the authors
recommended that “EMS can be diagnosed if either pattern 1 or 2 is satisfied”, so long
as other potential causes of illness were first ruled out. “EMS should not be diagnosed
in the presence of trichinosis, vasculitis, or any other documented infectious, allergic,
neoplastic, connective tissue or other type of disease that could adequately explain the
clinical manifestations” (Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2303).
So Hertzman et al. (2001) produced a set of criteria for the diagnosis of EMS that
they believed should be accurate. But how did they check that this was actually the
case? They needed a set of cases with known disease status to which they could apply
their criteria, to see if their criteria correctly classified these patients. As no formal
and accepted criteria existed to select cases who definitely did and did not have EMS,
Hertzman et al. (2001) invited a panel of experts to select cases to serve as this set
of cases with known disease status. “Because EMS lacks discrete pathognomonic
features, we thought that the best surrogate gold standard for testing the criteria would
be a set of reports of EMS cases and noncases that were generated and validated by
an external panel of experts” (Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2302). Each expert was asked
to provide five cases that they diagnosed with EMS, four cases without EMS but
diagnosed with conditions resembling EMS, and one possible but uncertain case of
EMS (Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2303). These cases were reviewed by the other panel
members, and if 75% of the panel agreed about this patient’s diagnosis then the case
was retained in the set with the agreed diagnosis. This procedure produced a population
of cases, 50 of whom were taken to have the disease, and 35 of whom were taken not
to have EMS, but instead to have a condition resembling EMS. This set of cases with
known disease status was referred to as “the gold standard set” (Hertzman et al. 2001,
p. 2303). Although these researchers thought that their reliance on the opinions of a
panel of experts is in some sense arbitrary, they still claimed that their gold standard
set was as objective as possible. “Although any gold standard, regardless of method
of construction, would be arbitrary, we believed that this approach would result in the
most appropriate objective standard possible” (Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2302).
Hertzman et al. (2001) then applied their diagnostic criteria to this gold standard set.
They found that each researcher was in close agreement with the others with regard
to which patients in the gold standard set satisfied their criteria. They found that their
criteria returned positive results in 44 of the 50 cases of EMS in the gold standard set,
showing a sensitivity of 88%. Their criteria returned negative results in 34 of the 35
cases of not EMS in the gold standard set, showing a specificity of 97%. As 78 out
of 85 results were correct, the overall accuracy of their criteria was measured as 92%.
Hertzman et al. (2001) conclude as follows:
The proposed criteria are accurate and reproducible, and can be used in future
clinical investigations of the eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome. The new strategy
and methods developed for this challenge can be valuable for solving analogous
Footnote 3 continued
myalgia or muscle cramps; or alternatively any three of fasciitis, myopathy, neuropathy, or eosinophilia
(Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2303).
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problems in constructing criteria for other clinical disorders (Hertzman et al.
2001, p. 2301).
Hertzman et al.’s (2001) approach to producing these diagnostic criteria is carefully
considered. They put in place a number of formal methods to try to ensure that the
test of their criteria is fair. In particular, they are at pains to emphasize that the expert
panel who produced the gold standard set was independent of the researchers who
applied the candidate diagnostic criteria. They also emphasize that the application of
these criteria was made without knowledge of the gold standard diagnosis for each
case. This was done so that the diagnostic decisions of the expert panel should not
inform the diagnostic decisions of the researchers. “The gold standard case sets were
defined and the criteria were interpreted independently, so the results of one process
did not influence the other”4 (Hertzman et al. 2001, p. 2306).
Despite these researchers’ efforts to keep the construction of the gold standard set
and the candidate diagnostic criteria independent, these processes are only independent
in a very limited sense. In standard studies of diagnostic accuracy, researchers are not
trying to measure the accuracy of the definitive diagnostic criteria for a disease, which
are the criteria used to define the group of patients with the disease (the gold or
reference standard). Rather, researchers are trying to measure the accuracy of some
supplementary test that is not used to define the group of patients with the disease (the
index test). Researchers typically want to know how accurate these supplementary
tests are because the definitive diagnostic criteria cannot be applied for some reason.
Perhaps these criteria too expensive to apply, or too invasive, or involve knowledge
of some future event such as the development of particular symptoms, or are post
mortem observations. In this case, however, researchers are trying to produce definitive
diagnostic criteria for use in clinical and research practice. Recall that the “elements”
from which Hertzman et al. (2001) fashioned the two patterns of EMS were deemed
to be the ten most important elements for the diagnosis of EMS. These elements that
make up the candidate diagnostic criteria are not supplementary observations. The
candidate diagnostic criteria are not independent of the observations used to produce
the gold standard set of patients— they are the observations used to produce the gold
standard set of patients.
Hertzman et al. (2001) do not describe which elements were judged to be important
by the expert panel as they assembled the gold standard set of cases. Even if the
elements used by the expert panel were the same as those judged to be the ten most
4 Both STARD and QUADAS require researchers to check that the gold standard and index test are inde-
pendent of each other. Independence in this context has at least two meanings. The first is that the researchers
applying the index test should be blinded to the results of the reference standard, and vice versa, so that this
knowledge does not influence their assessment of the test result. The second is that the index test should
not form a component part of the process by which the disease status of the patient is determined, because
this will mean that a patient that satisfies the gold standard will automatically be more likely to test positive
with the index test. The incorporation of the index test into the gold standard may lead to the appearance
that the index test is more accurate that it actually is, a situation referred to as “incorporation bias” (Worster
and Carpenter 2008; Newman and Kohn 2009, p. 99). The solution to this epistemic problem is to separate
the gold standard and the index test, which is simple to do under normal circumstances when an index test
is evaluated against a gold standard. However, when it is the gold standard that is under evaluation, the
epistemic challenge is rather more substantial.
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important by Hertzman et al. (2001), there is no way of telling if they were organised
into the same two patterns. Even so, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
seems sensible to assume that the patterns of elements used by the expert panel were
very similar to those proposed by Hertzman et al. (2001). This is because Hertzman
et al. (2001) judged these panellists to be fellow experts on EMS, and thus most likely
agreed with their views on EMS.
Readers of Hertzman et al. (2001) might be forgiven for believing that the accu-
racy of the diagnostic criteria proposed by these researchers had been established by
correlating the results of these observations with the disease status of patients. The
accuracy of these candidate diagnostic criteria is not established by empirical observa-
tion. Rather, they have (at least tacitly) been assumed by the expert panel to carry out
this study. The association of these patterns of elements and EMS is not established
by empirical observation in this study. Rather this association is a precondition for the
study to be carried out at all.
I do not want to be too critical of Hertzman et al. (2001). In the particular context of
the diagnosis of EMS, these researchers achieve most of their goals. Hertzman et al.
(2001) do not suggest that experts are not able to recognise EMS when they see it. The
diagnostic criteria they propose are probably not designed to assist experts in making
the diagnosis. These criteria appear designed to assist doctors who are not experts in
EMS in their clinical work and whilst doing epidemiological research into the disease.
Hertzman et al. (2001) sought to develop a set of diagnostic criteria that, when applied
by non-experts, could mimic the diagnostic performance of an expert.5 It may be that
Hertzman et al. (2001) sought to replicate the results of the very complex and perhaps
tacit decision-making process used by experts in EMS in a simple and explicit set of
diagnostic criteria. This research does contribute to these goals. Even so, Hertzman
et al. (2001) do not limit themselves to claiming that their diagnostic criteria faithfully
reproduce expert performance. They claim that their diagnostic criteria are accurate
at detecting EMS, that their gold standard set of patients was as objective as possible,
and that their methods should be used to assess the accuracy of diagnostic criteria in
other situations where there is no accepted gold standard.
3 Fibromyalgia
The problematic nature of this methodology for evaluating diagnostic criteria is appar-
ent from studies that do something like what Hertzman et al. (2001) suggest, but try to
use the results of their study to inform expert opinion about how to diagnose disease.
Consider the 1990 American College of Rheumatology guidelines on the diagnosis
of fibromyalgia (Wolfe et al. 1990). Fibromyalgia is a condition characterized by
widespread and unexplained pain, particularly in response to pressure applied to cer-
tain areas of the body described as “tender points”. The diagnosis of fibromyalgia is
5 Hertzman et al. (2001, p. 2305) also emphasise that they expect their suggested criteria to change as more
is learned about EMS. They do not claim to be certain that their diagnostic criteria are as accurate as they
say they are.
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contested, with some doctors denying that it is a discrete disease entity at all (Wessely
and Hotopf 1999; Cohen and Quintner 1993).
In contrast to Hertzman et al. (2001) in the case of EMS, these researchers empha-
sized the diversity of different diagnostic criteria that were employed by experts with
a special interest in fibromyalgia (Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 161). Two of the aims of
this research are stated as “to provide a consensus definition of fibromyalgia” and “to
establish new criteria for the classification of fibromyalgia” (Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 161).
Wolfe et al. (1990) are clear that their aim is to contribute to a discussion amongst
experts about how to identify patients with fibromyalgia.
Wolfe et al.’s (1990) methodology is similar to that suggested by Hertzman et al.
(2001). They invited a group of experts to put forward a set of 293 patients with and 265
without the disease.6 They then trained a group of “independent assessors” to interview
and examine these patients. These assessors collected information deemed relevant to
a diagnosis of fibromyalgia—including information about sleeping patterns, morning
stiffness, the presence of irritable bowel syndrome, the presence of widespread pain,
response to pressure applied at specific sites (the “tender points”), and sensitivity
to pain (measure with a dolorimeter) (Wolfe et al. 1990, pp. 161–162). Statistical
analyses were made to identify the combinations of elements which could serve as
diagnostic criteria.7 “[V]arious combinations of symptoms were tested in combination
with different levels of tender point positivity to identify which items or groups of items
performed best” (Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 163). Wolfe et al. (1990) concluded that the
presence of widespread pain and tenderness at at least 11 out of 18 tender points
were sufficiently accurate to be used as diagnostic criteria for fibromyalgia. “The
newly proposed criteria for the classification of fibromyalgia are (1) widespread pain
in combination with (2) tenderness at 11 or more of the 18 specific tender point sites”
(Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 160). Wolfe et al. (1990) also found that these criteria were more
accurate than any other combination of elements that they explored, and more accurate
than other candidate diagnostic criteria that had been suggested by other researchers
in the past. “Various combinations of tender point levels and groups of symptoms
were tested (as in the criteria described by Yunus et al.), but none proved to be as
sensitive, specific, and accurate as the combination of widespread pain and 11 of 18
tender points” (Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 170). Wolfe et al. (1990) therefore argued that the
diagnostic criteria they advocate should be accepted by experts because they are the
most accurate of all.
Wolfe et al. (1990) were concerned about the prospect that their conclusions may
simply be the result of the assumptions made to carry out the study, as was discussed
above in the case of EMS. These researchers were concerned about this because they
recognised that other studies had fallen into this trap, and deployed circular arguments:
6 Similarly to Hertzman et al. (2001), the patients put forward by Wolfe et al. (1990) as not having fibromyal-
gia were not clinically well, but rather judged to have another condition with a somewhat similar presentation.
7 This is a difference between the methodologies of Hertzman et al. (2001), who used their gold standard set
of patients to test the performance of candidate diagnostic criteria, and Wolfe et al. (1990), who inspected
patients with and without disease to produce their diagnostic criteria. I consider both of these practices to be
instances of inspecting groups of diseased and not-diseased patients to identify distinguishing characteristics.
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Even so, there were serious methodologic problems with these criteria sets. Most
had not been tested clinically, and none had been tested beyond the centers in
which they were designed. No studies had used blinding. Most often, the def-
initions for the historical features, and even the physical examination features,
were imprecise. The most important concern about the criteria, however, was
that they tended to be circular; that is, the criteria confirmed the definition of
fibromyalgia that was held by the investigators who developed them, a confir-
mation that might have been assisted by the unblinded status. It was with these
objections in mind that the committee undertook the current study (Wolfe et al.
1990, p. 161).
Wolfe et al. (1990) take steps to try to prevent the opinions of individual experts
influencing the outcome of their investigations. This is why they invited many different
experts to contribute cases to the study, so that the attitudes of one expert would not
be over-represented in the study:
The committee was aware that the way the investigators perceived the syndrome
might affect the diagnosis and the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnos-
tic criteria. To reduce diagnosis-criteria circularity, a “consensus” diagnosis of
fibromyalgia was obtained by inviting the participation of all centers in Canada
and the United States who had a known interest in fibromyalgia (Wolfe et al.
1990, p. 169).
Sadly, this precaution does not resolve the issue at hand. According to Wolfe et al.
(1990), different researchers had different opinions about how to diagnose fibromyal-
gia. Even so, the opinions of different researchers were not vastly different to those
of others. Wolfe et al. (1990) place the views of different researchers of a spectrum.
At one end are researchers who are happy to make the diagnosis of fibromyalgia in
patients who have a high number of tender points and widespread pain, even in the
absence of other symptoms. At the other are researchers who are happy to make the
diagnosis in patients with as few as two tender points, so long as other symptoms are
present in addition to widespread pain. In the middle are researchers who require both
additional symptoms and high counts of tender points (Wolfe et al. 1990, p. 161). So,
all parties adopted the view that widespread pain, the presence of tender points and
other symptoms were important for the diagnosis of fibromyalgia when selecting cases
for this study. As has been noted by other commentators on these studies (Wessely
and Hotopf 1999, p. 429; Cohen and Quintner 1993), it is therefore not surprising
that widespread pain, tender points and other symptoms were found to be important
for the diagnosis of fibromyalgia.8 The diagnostic criteria suggested by Wolfe et al.
8 Barker’s (2005) work on the sociology of fibromyalgia discusses Wolfe et al. (1990), which were the
American College of Rheumatology’s (ACR) guidelines for the diagnosis of fibromyalgia at one point.
Barker reports that many studies of diagnostic accuracy in fibromyalgia deploy circular arguments. “More-
over, the ACR’S analysis was built on a methodological flaw, set in motion by Smythe, and reproduced in
every subsequent FMS diagnostic study. FMS is a tautology, tender points both define and substantiate its
existence” (2005, p. 25). Barker does not, however, try to explain how such circular arguments get produced.
Neither does she identify that Wolfe et al. (1990) were aware of the problem of circular arguments, and
took steps to avoid this trap. It is worth exploring why researchers keep falling into this trap, even though
they try to avoid it.
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(1990) are not the outcome of the careful observation of patients. Rather, it is merely
a reflection of the aggregate opinion of a community of doctors who take a special
interest in patients with widespread pain. This research does not provide evidence
about the characteristics of patients who truly have this target condition, if there are
any such patients at all. “While these definitions did improve reliability, the reasoning
underlying both papers was essentially circular, and certainly did not provide any evi-
dence for the validity of the concept. Instead, ‘thus a pain syndrome is said to define
itself”’ (Wessely and Hotopf 1999, p. 429; citing Cohen and Quintner 1993).9
I offer no opinion about whether EMS and fibromyalgia as described by Hertz-
man et al. (2001) and Wolfe et al. (1990) are real, nor about whether these categories
are valuable or not. I only want to draw attention to the problem that arises when
researchers try to discover definitive diagnostic criteria by trying to correlate observa-
tions with disease status. Having described this problem in medical practice today, I
will now cast it as a manifestation of a very ancient philosophical issue, first described
in classical antiquity by Plato. This treatment of the problem may help medical pro-
fessionals recognise and address it.
4 Meno’s paradox
A helpful formulation of the problem with which the medics described above have been
struggling can be found in the Meno, which is one of Plato’s Socratic dialogues. This
formulation of the problem is referred to as Meno’s paradox. The Meno is a stylized
conversation held largely between two characters—Meno and Socrates. The main
subject of this dialogue is the nature of virtue, but at one point during the discussion
Meno reaches a point of despair, and argues that it is not possible to investigate the
nature of anything at all:
And how will you inquire into this, Socrates, when you don’t know at all what
it is? For what sort of thing, from among those you don’t know, will you put
forward as the thing you are inquiring into? And even if you really encounter it,
how will you know if this is the thing that you did not know? (Fine 2014, p. 7).
In response, Socrates immediately reformulates this challenge from Meno into a
dilemma:
I understand the sort of thing you want to say, Meno. Do you see what an eristic
argument you’re introducing, that it’s not possible for someone to inquire either
into that which he knows or into that which he doesn’t know? For he wouldn’t
inquire into that which he knows (for he knows it, and there’s no need for such
9 Circular arguments like the ones identified in this paper are quite common in the medical literature. Some
other examples can be found in the medical literature on thyroid disease (Gøtzsche 2007, pp. 80–81), giant
cell arteritis (Hunder et al. 1990), Takayasu arteritis (Arend et al. 1990), and non-accidental head injury
(Högberg et al. 2016). In my view, many such arguments are not the result of researchers accidentally
incorporating the index test into the reference standard, which is a simple problem to fix. Rather, these
arguments result from trying to directly inspect patients to discover the definitive diagnostic criteria for a
disease, and failing to realize that this is not possible.
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a person to inquire); nor into that which he doesn’t know (for he doesn’t even
know what he’ll inquire into) (Fine 2014, pp. 7–8).
This challenge by Meno, and the dilemma that Socrates makes out of it, are together
referred to as Meno’s paradox (Fine 2014). This passage is deemed paradoxical
because it appears to show that it is impossible to investigate anything, which is
contrary to everyday experience where it seems that this is possible. There is a large
philosophical literature discussing this paradox, what Plato meant by it, and possi-
ble ways to resolve it (Scott 2006, p. 75). In this paper I read Meno’s paradox in a
particular way, not because I believe that this is the only correct way to read it, but
rather because this reading helps me to highlight a serious epistemic difficulty faced
by researchers trying to evaluate diagnostic tests. For the purposes of this paper, I
read Plato presenting the problem that if one cannot define something, one cannot
recognise the instances of it in the world; and if one cannot do this, one cannot inspect
this thing to discover how it should be defined.10 Applying this passage to a medical
context, when researchers do not know how to identify the patients that have a disease,
it is impossible to discover how to identify these patients by direct observation of their
distinguishing characteristics.
It is useful to apply Meno’s challenge to medicine, especially if the group of patients
that have a disease are taken to be the thing that researchers want to investigate. Meno’s
challenge will raise its head whenever doctors do not know how to identify this group
of patients, and seek to discover how to identify them by direct observation. Doctors
can find themselves in exactly this situation when they try to measure the accuracy of
candidate diagnostic criteria when there is no agreed upon gold or reference standard.
Perhaps this is because no-one has suggested a reference standard, or because doctors
disagree about which reference standard is best. In any event, the general scheme
of research that seeks to measure diagnostic accuracy is always the same, and how
Meno’s challenge manifests can be understood in these terms.
Researchers seeking to measure diagnostic accuracy always start with a population
of patients, some of whom are diseased, and some of whom are not (see Fig. 1). The
characteristics that define the diseased group of patients are the definitive diagnostic
criteria. As the researchers seek to discover these definitive diagnostic criteria, it fol-
lows that they do not know what these are at the start of their study. In order discover
these characteristics, researchers may want to directly inspect diseased patients, so
10 The claim that if one does not know the definition of something then one cannot determine that thing’s
extension is problematic. Following Locke (1996, p. 185), if something’s definition is taken to be its real
essence, or what makes the thing the thing that it is, then it may be possible to know the thing’s nominal
essence, or the set of observable characteristics by which it can be recognised, without knowing its definition.
In the Meno, Plato appears to reject this possibility, and scholars have found this problematic. I also agree
with Ebrey (2014) that Plato is concerned with discovering “explanatory definitions”, or real essences. Here
I only take ‘definition’ to mean the way by which the extension of something can be fixed, or how it can
be recognised. I follow Fine (2014, p. 73), Irwin (1995, p. 131) and Scott (2006, p. 77) in reading Plato
as suggesting that if we cannot recognise something then we cannot fix its extension in order to study it.
However, I follow Ebrey (2014) in reading phrase “don’t know at all what it is” as not signalling that one
needs to be in a “complete mental blank” about something for the paradox to apply, as these scholars suggest
(see footnote 17).
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that they can be compared to one another and to not-diseased patients.11 To do this,
however, doctors must first be able to identify the diseased and not-diseased patients.
So all such research has two stages. In the first stage, patients are sorted into diseased
and not-diseased groups. The methods used to do this serve as the gold or reference
standard. In the second stage, these patients are inspected to identify distinguishing
characteristics, or to evaluate an index test. If researchers do not know how to identify
the group of patients with a disease, then they cannot discover distinguishing charac-
teristics by direct observation, because in order to do this they need to identify patients
with the disease, and this is precisely what they do not know how to do.
Researchers can, of course, discover further ways of distinguishing diseased and
not-diseased patients by directly inspecting them. Given that researchers know how
to distinguish these patients, it is possible to directly inspect them to discover other
characteristics that can be used to make this distinction. In Fig. 1, researchers use
characteristic Y to sort patients into diseased and not-diseased groups. Having done
this, researchers can then directly inspect these groups to discover other characteristics
that can be used to make the same distinction, such as characteristic Z.
What it is not possible to do is discover that characteristic Y can distinguish between
diseased and not-diseased patients by direct inspection. Characteristic Y is deemed to
be the most accurate test of all, as it is the test by which the accuracy of other tests are
judged. It serves as the gold or reference standard, and might even be considered as
the definitive diagnostic criteria for the disease in question. To measure the accuracy
of a test is to treat it as an index test—as a test under evaluation—and not as the most
accurate test of all. Therefore, the test deemed most accurate of all can never have its
accuracy measured. The status of being the most accurate test of all cannot be acquired
by measuring diagnostic accuracy through direct observation.
It is impossible to carry out a study that discovers the definitive diagnostic criteria,
the gold standard, the reference standard, or the way of diagnosing patients that is most
accurate of all, by direct observation. How can researchers study diseased patients
when they do not know how to identify them? For which patients, from the population
of patients whose disease status they do not know, will they put forward as the group
of patients they are inquiring into? Even if they did somehow manage to identify the
correct group of patients, how would they know that they had managed to identify this
group of patients, seeing as they do not know how to recognise them? Researchers that
already know the most accurate way to identify diseased patients have no need of such
a study; and researchers who do not know which is the most accurate way to identify
patients cannot carry out such a study, for they do not know how to identify the groups
of diseased and not-diseased patients in order to study them. Meno’s paradox actually
manifests in medical practice today.
A problem very like Meno’s paradox has been identified in more recent philosophi-
cal literature, and it may be valuable to consider the problems faced in medical practice
from this perspective as well. Chang (2004, p. 59) has drawn attention to a problem
that crops up when trying to measure temperature, which he calls “the problem of
11 The group of not-diseased patients may be comprised of patients who are entirely free of disease, or
to patients free of the particular disease the diseased patients have even though they do have some other
disease.
123
Synthese
nomic measurement”. When trying to construct an accurate thermometer, researchers
need to know how a particular thermometric fluid (perhaps mercury or air) expands
as its temperature increases. Ideally, a thermometric fluid would expand linearly with
increasing temperature, so the same increase in temperature would produce the same
amount of expansion at any starting temperature. But in order to measure how a ther-
mometric fluid expands, researchers need to be able to measure temperature of the
thermometric fluid, which means they need an accurate thermometer, and they do
not have one as this is what they are trying to make. It seems that unless researchers
already have an accurate thermometer, they cannot develop an accurate thermometer.
This is analogous to the problem in medicine, where researchers cannot develop an
accurate reference standard unless they already have an accurate reference standard.
Chang presents this problem formally as a general issue which will crop up anytime
researchers try to measure something that cannot be directly observed.12 He presents
the problem of nomic measurement as follows: “We want to measure some quantity
X”, which in Chang’s example is the temperature of some object. “Quantity X is
not directly observable, so we infer it from another quantity, Y, which is directly
observable”. Quantity Y in Chang’s example is the volume of some thermometric fluid.
Chang notes that if researchers are to make inferences about X using observations of
Y, then they need to know how X and Y are related. “For this inference we need a
law that expresses X as a function of Y, as follows: X = f(Y)”. He argues that this
relationship between X and Y cannot be established by direct observation, as X is
not directly observable. “The form of this function f cannot be discovered or tested
empirically, because that would involve knowing the values of Y and X, and X is the
unknown variable we are trying to measure” (Chang 2004, p. 59).
Chang calls this issue the problem of nomic measurement because he argues it will
apply “Whenever we have a method of measurement that rests on an empirical law”
expressing the relationship between two variables (Chang 2004, p. 59). The function
notation used by Chang to describe the continuous relationships captured in empirical
laws is difficult to apply to the cases I discuss here. The relationship between disease
status and diagnostic test results are usually expressed in terms of sensitivity and
specificity, which give the probability of patients with and without a disease getting
a particular test result. This treats disease status as a categorical variable, not as a
continuous one.13 Chang’s formulation of the problem of nomic measurement can be
modified to reflect this, and written as follows:
1. We want to detect all the patients suffering from a disease, who can collectively be
referred to as X (X might be those patients suffering from EMS or fibromyalgia).
2. It is not known how to detect this group of patients, X, so we infer their presence
or absence using another quantity, Y, which we know how to detect (Y might be
12 When Chang (2004) discusses things that cannot be observed directly, he is referring to metaphysical
entities that it is not possible to observe directly. Even so, this problem will still manifest in situations where
the thing in question is observable, but researchers do not know how to observe it. Consequently, this is
what I mean by cannot be directly observed here.
13 Some diseases, such as hypertension, do lend themselves to Chang’s continuous formulation. If
researchers choose to treat disease status as a continuous variable, then perhaps Chang’s original formulation
should be used.
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the presence of EMS patterns 1 or 2 in the absence of an alternative explanation
for this presentation in the case of EMS, or the presence of widespread pain and
11 out of 18 tender points in the case of fibromyalgia).
3. To make this inference, we need to know the relationship between X and Y.
4. We cannot determine this relationship between X and Y empirically, as to do this
we would need to be able to detect both X and Y, and X is the thing we are trying
to detect.
When researchers do not know how to identify the group of patients with a disease, it is
impossible to show that certain test results correlate with disease status. This is because
disease status needs to be known to make this correlation and disease status is unknown.
The problem of nomic measurement is a valuable reformulation of Meno’s paradox,
and may assist researchers in their thinking about the evaluation of diagnostic tests.
Chang also identifies that the problem of nomic measurement can lead to the devel-
opment of circular arguments in the attempt to justify the accuracy of a method of
measurement. As Chang points out, any attempt to demonstrate empirically that a
particular relationship between X (the condition we cannot detect directly) and Y (the
observations we hope to use to detect X) will result in a circular argument (Chang
2004, p. 89). This is because X cannot be detected without knowing the relationship
between X and Y, and the relationship between X and Y cannot be determined without
being able to detect X (Chang 2004, p. 89). By assuming that a certain relationship
between disease status (X) and diagnostic test result (Y) exist in order to identify
diseased patients and carry out their studies, and then claiming to have established
this relationship by direct observation of how these things are correlated, researchers
often assume what they claim to have shown, and deploy circular arguments.
To see how circular arguments are produced in medical literature that tries to assess
the diagnostic accuracy of the gold or reference standard, attend to Figs. 1 and 2
together. In Fig. 1, characteristic Y is used to sort patients into diseased and not-
diseased groups. The argument used to do this is presented in Fig. 2 as argument A.
Having sorted patients into diseased and not-diseased groups, researchers can inspect
these groups to discover distinguishing characteristics in stage 2. As discussed above,
researchers are welcome to use their results to support the view that characteristic Z is
only present in diseased patients. In Fig. 2, there is nothing wrong with using argument
B to follow argument A. However, there is something wrong with using argument C to
follow argument A. The conclusion of argument C is that patients with characteristic
Y have the disease, and this is taken as a premise in argument A, making the overall
argument circular. Any time researchers try to use observations made of diseased and
not-diseased patients to support the view that the way they sorted patients into diseased
and not-diseased groups is accurate will result in the production of circular arguments.
This will happen inevitably when researchers try to directly observe how accurate the
gold or reference standard is.
5 Rickets in infants
I will draw attention to one further example of researchers trying to directly observe
the characteristics of patients with and without disease. This is important to do, Meno’s
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Fig. 1 General scheme for all research measuring diagnostic accuracy
paradox does not only manifest in formal studies of diagnostic accuracy, where the
two-stage structure of such research is made explicit. It also manifests in less formal
arguments presented in discussions of how to diagnose disease, and this should be
highlighted.
My last case study is an article by Drs. Slovis and Chapman (2008b), which is
concerned with the diagnosis of rickets in infant children. The diagnosis of rickets in
infants is important in both legal and medical contexts. Parents or carers of infants
are sometimes accused of assault if the infants under their care are found to have
unexplained fractures. Rickets has been suggested as a possible explanation for these
fractures, and therefore as an alternative explanation to abuse.
Slovis and Chapman are the editors of a well-respected medical journal, Pediatric
Radiology, and were responding in their article to another article in the same edition
of this journal that argued that rickets should be considered as an alternative diagnosis
for patients with unexplained fractures (Keller and Barnes 2008). In this other article,
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Fig. 2 Arguments that might be deployed in studies of diagnostic accuracy. Argument A is used to identify
patients with disease X in stage 1. Argument A might be followed by either argument B or C in stage
2. In argument B, an index test (Z) is evaluated, which is fine. In argument C, the reference standard (Y)
is evaluated, producing a circular argument where the conclusion of argument C is the same as the first
premise of argument A
Drs. Keller and Barnes (2008) presented four cases with unexplained fractures, which
they argued were cases of rickets. They did this even though these cases did not have
what are considered to be the classic signs on X-ray examination that are normally
used to diagnose rickets. The classic signs of rickets are taken to be changes to a
region at the ends of long bones in growing children called the “growth plate” or
“physis” (Slovis and Chapman 2008b). Keller and Barnes (2008) argued that these four
patients had rickets because of evidence that either the infants or their mothers were
vitamin D deficient, and because of other radiographic abnormalities that these infants
displayed. Overall, they argued that vitamin D deficiency rickets can produce imaging
abnormalities that resemble traumatic fractures without the classic radiographic signs
of rickets, and therefore that rickets in the young infant can mimic abuse.
Slovis and Chapman (2008a), as editors of the journal, commented that this is a
controversial position. Nevertheless, they encouraged readers of the journal to consider
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the evidence that informs this issue carefully, and to draw conclusions based on this
data for themselves:
We believe that it is one of the responsibilities of a medical journal to publish
articles that present data that force us to rethink our preconceived notions. We
believe it is important that all pediatric radiologists understand this issue, as we
play a focal role in the diagnosis of child abuse (Slovis and Chapman 2008a).
Slovis and Chapman (2008b) began their own article by reaffirming that their goal
was to entertain the question of whether or not there are patients with rickets that do
not have the classic radiographic signs of rickets:
What is the evidence for fragility of bones in children with insufficient levels of
vitamin D and even in those with deficiency levels if the radiographs are normal,
that is, when there is no radiographic evidence of rickets? (Slovis and Chapman
2008b, p. 1221).
To address this question, Slovis and Chapman (2008b) chose what may be considered
a straightforward, simple and pragmatic methodology. They chose to directly inspect
the cases presented by Keller and Barnes (2008) to see if there were any cases of
rickets without the classic radiographic signs amongst them. The particular patients
in question here were the four cases discussed by Keller and Barnes (2008)—cases
1, 2, 3, and 4. But before Slovis and Chapman (2008b) could look and see whether
any of these patients had rickets without the classic radiographic signs of rickets, they
needed to determine which of these patients actually had rickets. To do this they used
a commonplace definition of rickets to decide if a patient had rickets or not:
The definition of rickets is “an interruption in the development and mineralization
of the growth plate of bone, with radiographic abnormalities”. Merely having
insufficiency/deficiency of vitamin D levels in the blood does not constitute
rickets. It is, therefore, incumbent to show radiographic changes in the 30–50%
of infants and children with low vitamin D to claim that they have rickets (Slovis
and Chapman 2008b, p. 1221).
For a patient to have rickets, Slovis and Chapman (2008b) said that the patient must
have certain changes to the growth plate of their bones. In other words, they must
have the classic radiographic changes associated with rickets. Slovis and Chapman
(2008b) argued that none of these cases had rickets because none of them had the
classic radiographic signs of rickets:
It is apparent in all the images of Keller and Barnes that the epiphysis and
metaphysis are not separated and the physis is normal. There is no cupping and
fraying. By definition, radiological rickets is not present in these images (Slovis
and Chapman 2008b, p. 1222).14
14 Slovis and Chapman (2008b) use a variety of different terms to describe rickets and the related diagnostic
observations. For instance, they sometimes refer to “radiographic abnormalities”, to “radiographic changes”,
and to “radiographic findings” (2008b, p. 1221). They also refer to “radiographic rickets” and “radiological
rickets”, as well as simply to “rickets” (2008b, p. 1222). This opens the possibility that they are referring to
different types of rickets with different sets of diagnostic criteria. In my view, abnormalities/changes/findings
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As none of the cases presented by Keller and Barnes (2008) were deemed to have
rickets, Slovis and Chapman (2008b) argued that none of these cases provided evidence
that there are patients with unexplained fractures who are cases of rickets who do not
have the classic radiographic signs of rickets. “For these reasons and because of the
other data described, we find that the connection made by Keller and Barnes between
“rickets” and fractures they consider to be similar in appearance to those seen in child
abuse is not based on any scientific data” (Slovis and Chapman 2008b). In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, they concluded that a diagnosis of rickets should not be
made without radiographic evidence of changes to the growth plate:
The work-up of child abuse considers a differential diagnosis including rickets
but, unless there is reasonable evidence of rachitic bone disease, there is no
scientific basis for confusing vitamin D insufficiency/deficiency alone with child
abuse (Slovis and Chapman 2008b, p. 1224).
According to this definition, it is necessary that a patient have certain changes to the
growth plate to be considered as a case of rickets. The reason Slovis and Chapman
(2008b) found that none of the cases presented by Keller and Barnes (2008) had rickets
was because these cases showed none of these radiographic changes in the region of
the growth plate. So the conclusion that patients do not have rickets unless they have
these radiographic changes to their growth plate is supported by the assumption that
patients do not have rickets unless they have these radiographic changes to the growth
plate. Slovis and Chapman (2008b) assumed what they claimed to have shown, and
deployed a circular argument.15
Again, I argue that this circular argument is connected to the problem of nomic
measurement.16 Slovis and Chapman (2008b) sought to provide evidence that rickets
(X) does not occur without radiographic changes at the growth plate (Y). But the
Footnote 14 continued
are used interchangeably. I read “radiographic” and “radiological” rickets refer to rickets that has been
properly diagnosed, or at least to a necessary component of the proper diagnosis of rickets.
15 Slovis and Chapman’s (2008b) argument can be written out formally. As in Figs. 1 and 2, this argument
is made in two stages. The first stage determines whether or not the four cases cited by Keller and Barnes
(2008) are cases of rickets:
• All cases of rickets show the classic radiographic signs associated with rickets.
• Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not have the classic radiographic signs of rickets.
Therefore (by deduction)
• Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not have rickets.
The second stage determines whether there are any cases of rickets without the classic radiographic signs
of rickets amongst these cases:
• Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not have rickets.
• Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not have the classic radiographic signs of rickets
Therefore (by simple enumerative induction)
• There are no cases of rickets that do not have the classic radiographic signs associated with rickets.
The conclusion of the second stage argument is logically equivalent to the first premise of the first stage
argument. The overall argument is therefore circular.
16 Slovis and Chapman (2008b) stipulate that, by definition, all patients with rickets have the classic
radiographic signs of rickets. They may not view this association of rickets and radiographic signs as law of
nature which they trust, but rather as part of the meaning of rickets. Chang’s problem of nomic measurement,
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relationship between rickets and radiographic changes at the growth plate cannot
be determined by observation unless the presence of rickets can be determined, and
Slovis and Chapman (2008b) determine the presence of rickets using knowledge of
the relationship between rickets and radiographic changes at the growth plate. By
seeking to evaluate what they take to be the definitive diagnostic criteria for rickets,
Slovis and Chapman (2008b) accept that they do not know how to identify patients
with rickets (at least for the purposes of their paper). By trying to make this evaluation
by directly inspecting patients to see whether there are any patients with rickets who
do not satisfy these criteria, Slovis and Chapman (2008b) take on an impossible task.
If researchers do not know how to identify the group of patients with rickets, then
they cannot directly observe what the distinguishing characteristics of these patients
are, because in order to do this they need to identify patients with rickets, and this is
precisely what they do not know how to do.
In 2013, 5 years after Keller and Barnes (2008) and Slovis and Chapman (2008b)
had presented their arguments, Strouse (2013, p. 1423) revisited this matter in the
same journal. Strouse (2013) argued that Keller and Barnes’ (2008) arguments were
refuted by Slovis and Chapman’s (2008b) arguments, as well as by subsequent work:
Perhaps better stated, the hypotheses of “Keller & Barnes” have been disproved.
Whether in legal proceedings or in medical literature, it is inexcusable and inap-
propriate to cite “Keller & Barnes,” particularly without simultaneously citing
the accompanying commentary by Slovis and Chapman and the subsequent com-
mentary by Feldman (Strouse 2013, p. 1424).
This shows that, even in 2013, many researchers still had not recognised that Slovis
and Chapman’s (2008b) argument is circular. That Slovis and Chapman (2008b) have
set themselves an impossible task has not been realised either.
Slovis and Chapman (2008b) and Keller and Barnes (2008) have a fundamental
disagreement about how to identify patients with rickets. Even though they may agree
about which patients have rickets in many cases, they still disagree in these few cases.17
Such a disagreement cannot be resolved by directly inspecting patients with rickets,
as this requires that these parties agree about which patients have rickets, and this
is what they are arguing about. Meno’s paradox manifests even when researchers are
evaluating diagnostic criteria informally, without explicitly measuring sensitivities and
specificities of diagnostic tests.
6 There are other ways to evaluate reference standards
I have argued that it is impossible to discover how to distinguish diseased and
not-diseased patients by directly inspecting these patients, in an effort to correlate
characteristics with disease status. It would be remiss to leave the reader with the
Footnote 16 continued
which refers to laws of nature that are trusted enough to use to make measurements, may not strictly apply
here. Nevertheless, Chang’s insight still provides a valuable way to think about the rickets case.
17 This shows that researchers do not have to be in a “complete mental blank” about something for the
problems associated with Meno’s paradox to manifest (see footnote 10).
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impression that I believe it to be impossible to investigate how to distinguish diseased
from not-diseased patients. It is useful to close with a few comments on alternative
ways of investigating how to identify diseased patients.
In the introduction, I drew attention to Reitsma et al. (2009), who review the different
methods used by medical researchers to evaluate the accuracy of diagnostic tests in
the absence of a gold or reference standard. All of these methods deserve greater
philosophical attention. Reitsma et al. (2009) argue that even though these methods
might be useful in different circumstances, none of them provide a generally reliable
method of measuring diagnostic accuracy in the absence of a reference standard.
In addition to these methods of measuring diagnostic accuracy, Reitsma et al.
(2009) suggest that the effort to identify accurate diagnostic tests might be aban-
doned altogether. “If none of these methods for repairing standard imperfections seem
appropriate, the diagnostic accuracy paradigm may be abandoned in favor of alterna-
tive methods for evaluating tests” (Reitsma et al. 2009, p. 903). This is quite a dramatic
shift in thinking about what diagnostic tests are supposed to do. Medical researchers,
reflecting on this different philosophical attitude, describe it as a shift from being
essentialist,18 and worrying about finding tests that capture the correct classification
of patients in a deep ontological sense, to being consequentialist, and worrying about
how adopting one test rather than another affects patient outcomes (Patrick Bossuyt,
co-author of STARD and QUADAS, personal communication). Instead of worrying
about whether a test is accurate, Reitsma et al. (2009) join others in pointing out that
that researchers could instead worry about whether a test is useful (see also Haynes
and You 2009; Newman and Kohn 2009, p. 7).19 In this context utility refers to the
ability of the test to select patients who have some property that is of interest. Perhaps
they generally respond better to a particular therapy, or perhaps it is possible to offer
an accurate prognosis for these patients. Utility is complex to assess, as the usefulness
of a test will depend on the clinical circumstances in which it is applied. This can lead
to pluralistic classificatory practices, where doctors argue that “There is no single best
way to classify people into those with different diagnoses; the optimal classification
scheme depends on the purpose for making the diagnosis” (Newman and Kohn 2009,
p. 8).20
However, as Reitsma et al. (2009) correctly point out, that even this approach is not
unproblematic. They argue (in a manner commensurate with the Duhem–Quine thesis
18 As noted in the introduction, Meno’s paradox can still cause problems when trying to measure diagnos-
tic accuracy even when diseases are understood as subjective things, which do not have essences. Some
researchers have nevertheless used the language of essentialism to describe their concerns about the evalu-
ation of diagnostic tests.
19 Both Haynes and You (2009) and Newman and Kohn (2009) recommend that the accuracy of a test be
measured before its usefulness is considered, so that resources are not wasted on inaccurate tests “Again if
a test is not accurate, you can stop; it cannot be useful” (Newman and Kohn 2009, p. 7). This makes the
measurement of accuracy an important part of the demonstration of usefulness. Reitsma et al. (2009) are
more radical than these authors in suggesting that researchers focus on usefulness rather than accuracy.
20 Drawing on the work of Heinrik Wulff (1976) and Alvan Feinstein (1967), H. Tristram Engelhardt has
long been arguing along these lines. “What I have been suggesting here is a proposal for constructing various
alternate typologies of disease, aimed at facilitating different sorts of clinical decision-making…It is in this
sense that typologies of disease are not true or false in any straightforward fashion but rather are more or
less useful in the conduct of clinical medicine” (Engelhardt 1985, p. 67).
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in the philosophy of science) that if the patients selected by a diagnostic practice do
not have the expected clinical outcomes, then there will always be a number of ways in
which this conflict with experience can be explained: “Whenever the index test results
fail to show the hypothesized network of associations, more than one conclusion is
possible—the index test has low validity, the theory about the target condition is not
correct, or both” (Reitsma et al. 2009, p. 804). Given this, even focusing on the clinical
outcomes of adopting different diagnostic practices does not fully determine which
diagnostic practices should be adopted. It seems that there are no uncontroversial
solutions to the problem of how to evaluate diagnostic practices in the absence of
an agreed upon reference standard in the wider literature.21 The utility of all these
different potential ways of evaluating diagnostic practices is an important area of
ongoing research in medical practice, and one to which philosophers of science and
medicine should be able to contribute.
Another alternative approach is not necessarily to abandon the paradigm of diag-
nostic accuracy, but rather to change the method of inference used to assess diagnostic
accuracy. As discussed above, diagnostic accuracy is usually assessed by correlating
diagnostic test results with disease status. Finding that certain test results correlate well
with disease status in a study, and perhaps finding that this correlation is reproduced in
other studies, is taken to indicate that this correlation will hold generally in the future.
However, researchers are not forced to investigate disease using such inductive infer-
ences alone—abduction may also be useful.22 Abduction is a method of inference that
is used to explain observations that at first do not make sense to researchers (Lipton
2004; Hanson 1958, p. 86). “Its governing idea is that explanatory considerations are
a guide to inference, that scientists infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis
which would, if correct, best explain that evidence” (Lipton 2008, p. 193).
Abduction is used by medical researchers, even if they do not recognise this explic-
itly. In addition to the argument discussed above, Slovis and Chapman (2008b, p.
1223) also argue using abduction. They argue that it is surprising that there are so few
patients with unexplained fractures, given that there is an epidemic of infants with low
vitamin D levels. This would be explained if low vitamin D does not cause increased
skeletal fragility and unexplained fractures. So, there is reason to believe that the epi-
21 Reitsma et al. (2009) do not consider the possibility of using pathophysiological knowledge to evaluate
reference standards. Other researchers, however, do. For example, Knottnerus and Muris (2009, p. 55) argue
that it is important to use pathophysiological knowledge to produce new and better reference standards,
because evidence of correlation alone will never be able to demonstrate that a new reference standard is more
accurate than the old one. “Therefore, pathophysiological expertise should be involved in the evaluation of
diagnostic accuracy” (Reitsma et al. 2009, p. 55). This attitude results in something of a paradox, as these
proponents of evidence-based medicine found their knowledge of diagnosis on pathophysiological expertise.
As knowledge of whether a treatment works to cure a particular disease is itself founded on knowledge
of diagnosis, this means that evidence of the efficacy of treatment is also founded on pathophysiological
expertise. This runs counter to the tenets of evidence-based medicine, which downplays the importance of
pathophysiological expertise (Clarke et al. 2014; Solomon 2015).
22 Induction is sometimes taken to refer to any ampliative form of inference, but here I use induction to
refer to induction by enumeration (Hawthorne xxxx). The term ‘abduction’ is used in a variety of different
ways in philosophical literature. In particular, some commentators want to distinguish between ‘abduction’
as an inference that suggest new hypotheses, and ‘inference to the best explanation’ an inference that gives
reason to accept an existing hypothesis in preference to others (Douven xxxx; Mcauliffe 2015; Campos
2011). I don’t make use of this distinction here.
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demic of low vitamin D levels does not cause increased levels of skeletal fragility
and unexplained fractures. The diagnosis of EMS also appears to have been originally
suggested as the result of an abduction, as researchers tried to make sense of a number
of patients who presented with strange and unexplained symptoms (Bulpitt et al. 1990;
Hertzman et al. 1990). Research into the historical processes by which these patterns
were identified may be useful in contemporary conversations about how to diagnose
disease. Abduction has been identified as an important method of inference in medical
discovery and diagnostics (Johansson and Lynø 2008, pp. 121–125; Walton 2005, p.
175). As Sami Paavola and Hakkarainen (2005) have argued, abduction may be a way
to resolve the problems presented by Meno’s paradox.23
7 Conclusion
The measurement of diagnostic accuracy is an important aspect of the evaluation of
diagnostic tests. Diagnostic accuracy is measured by comparing the performance of the
observation or test under evaluation against a gold or reference standard, which is the
test deemed to be the most accurate of all. This amounts to correlating the presence and
absence of an observation or test result with the disease status of patients. Research
measuring diagnostic accuracy always has two stages. In the first, the population
of patients being studied is divided into diseased and not-diseased groups. In the
second, these groups are inspected to find characteristics that can be used to distinguish
diseased and not-diseased patients.
Sometimes, however, doctors are unsure about how to identify the patients who
actually have the disease in question, and there is debate about what set of diagnostic
criteria should be used as the gold standard. In these circumstances, researchers are
presented with an ancient philosophical problem. This was first articulated in Plato’s
Meno, and has been discussed again more recently as the problem of nomic measure-
ment (Chang 2004). If researchers do not know how to identify the group of patients
with a disease, then they cannot directly observe what the distinguishing character-
istics of these patients are, because in order to do this they need to identify patients
with the disease, and this is precisely what they do not know how to do. If disease
status is unknown, then it is impossible to correlate test results with disease status.
Even so, I have provided three examples of medical researchers that try to do just
this, and produce circular arguments as a result; drawn from the medial literature on
EMS, fibromyalgia, and rickets. That it is impossible to establish what should serve as
definitive diagnostic criteria by assessing diagnostic accuracy needs to be more widely
recognised.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank University of Exeter Medical Students who have taken the
Thinking critically about diagnosis Medical Humanities Student Selected Unit, where the issues explored
in this paper have been extensively discussed. In particular, I want to thank Thomas Bennett and Jess Chan
23 I will say no more here about whether the many other ways scholars have sought to resolve Meno’s
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